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A BRIEF SURVEY OF AVIATION CASE
LAW IN WISCONSIN
SUEL 0. ARNOLD
In his stimulating essay, "Aviation Law Comes Home to the Main
Street Lawyer", the author' warns us that we are on the threshold of
the aviation law era, and reminds us that it is the average practitioner
at the bar, rather than the student or specialist, who may get a jolt,
unless he can acquaint himself with some fundamentals.
A plethora of accidents, three of which in stunning succession, in-
volved army DC-4's converted for peace-time airline use, the last
of which resulted in the death of a well-known member of this associa-
tion2 is ample fulfillment of the prophesy and portends tort liabilities
of astronomical proportions. Despite some spectacular crashes, the
damage inflicted until recently has been miraculously low.3 With the
heavy increase in scheduled air-line traffic which will inevitably be a
concomitant of the post-war period, together with the mushroom
growth of chartered passenger, freight and express transportation,
to which will be added the flights of private planes accommodating the
half million pilots now in the country, it is to be expected that the loss
of life and the destruction of property incident to aviation will sharply
increase. G. C. A. and I. L. S. and improved methods of fog dispersal
will accomplish a great deal in the elimination of accidents, but it is
not to be expected that much will be accomplished in preventing pilot
and other personnel error in the next decade.
Diversified uses of small aircraft have given rise to new safety
problems. Spraying and crop dusting of peas recently resulted in two
fatal plane crashes in one day within one hundred miles of Milwaukee,
destroying both planes and killing the pilots. Planting of fingerlings
in lakes by airplane, utilization of planes for towing advertising signs,
and transportation of supplies with ski-equipped planes to isolated
communities after severe blizzards will add to the accident toll. Such
'John C. Cooper, XI Law and Contemporary Problems, 556.
2 Mr. I. E. Goldberg, for many years a member of the State and American
Bar Associations, met death in the crash of a DC-4 in West Virginia on June
13, 1947.
3 Crash of B-24 into gas holder in Chicago, May 20, 1943, damage $1,265,000;
crash of C-60 into hangar, May 6, 1945, damage $3,000,000; crash of B-25 into
Empire State building, July, 1945.
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increase in accidents will inevitably mean a multiplication of legal
problems.
The student of aviation law will find a paucity of decisions in
Wisconsin. There are eight cases in all in which aviation has been in-
volved. One of these cases distinguished between proprietary and gov-
ernmental functions of a state agency; two cases interpreted aviation
exclusionary clauses in life insurance policies; three cases presented
questions under the workmen's compensation act, and two cases dealt
with the question of liability for damages sustained at the airport.
(A) Governmental vs. proprietary functions.
The earliest aviation law case in Wisconsin is Morrison vs. Fisher.4
In that case the members of the Wisconsin State Board of Agriculture
entered into a contract with Wright Brothers for exhibition flights
during the State Fair in September, 1910. It was arranged that take-
offs and landings should be made from the race track in front of the
grand stand. On one of the take-offs, the airplane reached an altitude
of thirty feet, and then settled back to the ground striking and injuring
the plaintiff.
The jury exonerated the pilot of negligence, but found that the
Board was negligent in permitting the flights to be made. Judgment
was entered upon the verdict in favor of the plaintiff from which an
appeal was taken to the Supreme Court.
In reversing the judgment, and dismissing the plaintiff's complaint,
the Supreme Court held that the giving of a state fair under the Wis-
consin statutes was a governmental function of the state from which
the board derived no pecuniary profit. The court, therefore, held that
the board was not liable for the negligence of its members, agents or
officers.
In recent years there has been a decided trend in the courts to in-
crease the scope of liability for negligence and to narrow the field of
governmental immunity against tort liability. Undoubtedly this trend
has been due in part to legislative enactments. Another factor which
has actuated the cotirts in permitting recovery by injured parties is
the wide-spread use of public liability insurance by governmental
agencies. In the light of modern decisions it is probable that Morrison
vs. Fisher would not now be followed.
Special problems will constantly arise in connection with airports.
We may, for example, pose the problem as to whether the City of
Green Bay in operating its airport does so in a proprietary or govern-
mental capacity. In Iowa, Georgia and Tennessee it has been held that
a municipality operates its airport in a governmental capacity, while in
-1160 Wis. 621, 152 N. W. 475, 1 Avi. 38 (1915).
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Florida, Texas, California, Oregon, Oklahoma, Michigan and Alabama
it has been held that a municipal airport is operated in a proprietary
capacity.5
It has been recently pointed out6 that the case law in Wisconsin is
a welter of hopeless confusion with respect to the distinction between
a governmental function and a proprietary function performed by a
municipal corporation. In Virovatz vs. Cudahy7 it was held that the
operation of a swimming pool was a governmental function, but in
Christian vs. New London" it was held that the furnishing of street
lighting service by a municipally owned electric utility was a proprie-
tary function.
A number of activities conducted at an airport, such as the opera-
tion of a restaurant, the furnishing of taxi service, or the operation of
a flying school for profit, may readily be catalogued as proprietary in
nature. On the other hand, there are some activities which will give
rise to serious questions. Suppose that the City of Green Bay erected
a control tower for the purpose of directing aerial traffic in the vicinity
of the airport, and that the operator employed by the city was negli-
gent in directing the landing of an airplane either by the use of radio
or an Aldis lamp. We venture to predict that in such a case liability
of the municipality will be denied upon the ground that it is performing
a mere governmental function. 9
In the case of buildings located on an airport, little difficulty may
be anticipated. It is now well settled that the safe place statute0 applies
to public buildings. Failure to construct or maintain the buildings,
and the parts thereof designed for use by the public, in as safe a con-
dition as the circumstances reasonably permit, results in liability on the
part of the municipality in case injury is sustained by reason of a vio-
lation of the statutory duty.""
Liability of the municipality is not absolute under the statute. Sup-
pose a pilot wanders into the operations room at Billy Mitchell Field in
Milwaukee reserved for the use of employees, or strays into the por-
tion of the building reserved for the employees of the weather bureau
and is injured. Under the decision in Flynn vs. Chippewa County 2
there could be no recovery. In that case a prisoner committed to the
county jail was injured in a portion of the building which was not de-
signed for use by the public. The court held that the safe place statute
5 Rhyne, Airports and the Courts, 73; Annotation 83 A. L. R. 350.
6 1941 Wisconsin Law Review, 540.
7211 Wis. 357, 247 N. W. 341 (1933).
8 234 Wis. 123, 126-127, 290 N. W. 621 (1940).
9 See Finfera vs. Thomas, 119 F. (2nd) 28 (C.C.A. 6, 1941).
'0 Sec. 101.06, Wis. Stats.
"1 Heiden vs. Milwaukee, 226 Wis. 92, 275 N. W. 922 (1937).
12 244 Wis. 455, 12 N. W. (2nd) 683 (1944).
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did not apply, and that since the county operated the jail in its govern-
mental capacity, there could be no recovery by the plaintiff.
In the event of an accident at a municipal airport at any point out-
side of the buildings a different situation exists. The safe place statute
which in terms applies only to public buildings 3 clearly can afford no
comfort to the injured person.14
There is ample precedent in Wisconsin to sustain the conclusion
that an airport such as Billy Mitchell Field in Milwaukee which is
operated by Milwaukee County for profit has the same status as though
it were privately owned. With respect to its operation in a proprietary
capacity, there is no distinction between such an airport and a munici-
pally owned electric or gas utility.15 Where, however, the municipality
does not operate the airport for profit, a cogent argument may be made
that such an airport stands upon the same ground as an electric plant
operated by a municipality solely for street lighting purposes.16 Tort
liability may thus depend upon a question of fact.
(B) Life Insurance Aspect of Aviation Law.
In Charete vs. Prudential Insurance Company1 7 an action was
brought to recover on a policy of life insurance containing a clause for
an additional payment of $2,000 in the event of accidental death. The
policy contained the following exception:
"Provided, however, that no accidental death benefit shall
be payable if such death resulted from * * * having been en-
gaged in aviation * * *"
The insured met death by drowning when the plane he was piloting
crashed into Milwaukee Bay. Judgment for the plaintiff was entered
by the trial court and the insurance company appealed. The supreme
court sustained the judgment of the lower court upon the ground that
the policy provision was ambiguous, and that the situation was one for
the application of the familiar rule that an interpretation most favor-
able to the insured would be adopted.
In Bolonski vs. Bankers Life Company' the question presented was
whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover under a policy which
provided:
"The disability benefits herein provided shall not be granted
if the disability shall result from * * * engaging or participating
as a passenger or otherwise in aviation or aeronautics."
13 Sec. 101.06, Wis. Stats.
14 Herrick vs. Luberts, 230 Wis. 387, 389, 284 N. W. 27 (1939). Compare Bent
vs. Jonet, 213 Wis. 635, 252 N. W. 290 (1934), and Jaeger vs. Evan. Luth. Holy
Ghost Cong. 219 Wis. 209, 262 N. W. 585 (1935).
15 Christian vs. New London, 234 Wis. 123, 290 N. W. 621 (1940).
16 Christian vs. New London, supra, note 15.
17 202 Wis. 470, 232 N. W. 848, 1 Avi. 245 (1930).
18 209 Wis. 5, 243 N. W. 410, 1 Avi. 353 (1932).
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The plaintiff was preparing to take off on a solo flight in a plane
and was injured by the propeller as he was attempting to start the
engine. The court held that the plaintiff when injured was engaging
in aviation or aeronautics within the meaning of the exemption pro-
vision, and for that reason the judgment of the trial court denying
recovery was affirmed.
These decisions cannot be reconciled upon any rational basis. The
former is in line with the weight of authority. 19 The modem trend
of thought is mirrored in Bull vs. Sun Life Assur. CompanyY' In that
case the policy provided that there could be no recovery where death
resulted from service, travel or flight in an aircraft as a passenger or
otherwise. The assured was a lieutenant in the Navy and was shot
down by the Japanese in the Pacific Ocean. When last seen, he was
attempting to launch a rubber raft from a wing of the airplane. While
he was so engaged, a Japanese plane strafed the wreckage, and the
lieutenant was never seen again. The court allowed recovery under
the policy.
In some jurisdictions recovery is denied upon authority of cases
such as the Blonski case. Thus in Order of United Commercial Trav-
elers vs. King2 ' the policy sued upon contained a clause excluding lia-
bility for death resulting from participation as a passenger or otherwise
in aviation. The insured was piloting a plane which crashed in the At-
lantic Ocean. The pilot was seen alive in the water but his body found
later indicated death from drowning. Recovery was denied under the
policy. The court distinguished the Bull case upon the ground that
there the death of the assured was caused -by Japanese gun fire.
Life insurance companies have in recent years taken cognizance
of the development of aviation with the result that the old exclusionary
clauses have been quite generally limited to cases where the assured
is piloting the aircraft. Recovery may thus be had where the assured
is a passenger in any type of aircraft. It is therefore improbable
that the question presented in the Blonski case will again confront the
Wisconsin Supreme Court.
(C) Workman's Compensation in Aviation Law.
In Indebro. vs. Industrial Com-missionz2 the industrial commission
denied compensation because of the death of the claimant's husband.
The death was caused by a crash of an airplane in which the deceased
was flying as a passenger. The commission concluded from the evi-
dence that the decedent was merely taking a trip in the airplane and
'9 Annotations 83 A.L.R. 384; 99 A.L.R. 199. See War and Aviation clauses in
Life Insurance Policies, Price, XIV Ins. Counsel Journal, January, 1947.
20 141 F. (2d) 456 (C.C.A. 7, 1944).
21 161 F. (2d) 108 (C.C.A. 4, 1947).
22209 Wis. 272, 243 N. W. 464, 1 Avi. 354 (1932).
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was not performing any services incidental to his employment. The
Supreme court upheld the award upon the ground that the evidence
sustained the award. It was remarked by the court that had the find-
ing of the Industrial Commission been to the contrary, the court quite
likely would have been obliged to uphold it.
The second conpensation case involving aviation was Sheboygan
Airways, Inc. vs. Industrial Commission3 . In that case the deceased
was employed as a flight instructor and met his death when the plane
in which he was flying with two passengers crashed. The Industrial
Commission awarded compensation upon findings that at the time
of his injury the deceased was engaged in performing service grow-
ing out of and incidental to his employment by the Sheboygan Airways,
Inc. It was contended by the employer that the deceased was engaged
in acrobatic flying, contrary to air-traffic rules, at the time of his
death, and that his action while so doing took him out of his course
of employment. In answering the objection, the Industrial Commission
remarked that there was evidence from which it might be inferred
that the deceased was engaged in acrobatic or stunt flying, and the
Commission concluded that whether or not the deceased was engaged
in stunt or acrobatic flying was immaterial. The judgment of the
trial court vacating and setting aside the award of the Industrial Com-
mission was reversed, and the cause was remanded with directions
to the Industrial Commission to make findings as to whether the de-
ceased had engaged in stunt or acrobatic flying.
In Fliteways, Inc. vs. Ind. Comm.2 4 the deceased was employed as
a flight instructor and met his death while he was accompanied by a
student on an instructional flight. According to the testimony of wit-
nesses, the plane was buzzing a tavern which was operated by a student
of the flight instructor. A number of- students of the instructor had
organized a flying club the headquarters of which was in the tavern.
When the plane was making a turn about forty feet from the ground,
one of the wings struck a power wire, the plane crashed, and both of
the occupants of the plane were killed. Expert testimony was intro-
duced to establish that the flight instructor was violating the air traffic
rules of the Civil Aeronautics Board. The applicant offered evidence
tending to establish that at times students become terrified and that
they "freeze" to the "stick" thus making it impossible for the instructor
to control the plane. The Industrial Commission found that the instruc-
tor was performing service growing out of and incidental to his em-
ployment at the time of his. death and awarded compensation to his
dependents. The judgment of the trial court approving the award of
the Industrial Commission was affirmed by the supreme court.
23209 Wis. 352, 245 N. W. 178, 1 Avi. 413 (1932).
24249 Wis. 496, 24 N. W. (2d) 900, 2 Avi. 14.251 (1946).
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It has long been traditional in Wisconsin that if there is any credible
evidence to sustain an award of the Industrial Commission it will not
be disturbed by the courts. In the Fliteways case the conclusion is
irrefragable that the flight instructor was violating the air-traffic rules
established by the Civil Air Board. Had the trial judge or any of the
members of the supreme court operated a plane as a pilot, there
would have been at least a vigorous dissent expressed. Every pilot
is familiar with and can quickly recognize "buzzing." Here there is
no penumbral field justifying judicial divagations. Flight at tree top
level or power line altitude can never be justified upon the conjectural
ground that the student was "frozen" to the controls.
Violations of the air traffic rules have become a matter of grave
concern to the aviation industry and to every licensed pilot. Wiscon-
sin, in common with other states, has recognized the evil, and at the
current session of the legislature, has proscribed reckless flying.2 5 It
will now be the duty of the Industrial Commission and the courts to
lend their assistance in eliminating this hazard to the development
of aviation.
(D) Tort Liability and Aviation Law.
The growth of aviation in Wisconsin is noteworthy in the field of
jurisprudence because of the dearth of cases involving tort liability.
The student might reasonably expect to find a considerable body of
case law developing from a thirty-year period of flying at airports now
numbering well over two hundred, of which one hundred twenty-five
are actively operational. 2 The fact that during this period only two
cases, both of which occurred at airports, have been decided by the
supreme court, is an eloquent tribute to the ability and skill of the
pilots.
In Greunke vs. North American Airways Co. 27 a plane landed with
a dead engine on a runway at an airport. Before the pilot could get the
plane off the runway, another plane landed and collided with it. The
trial court instructed the jury that the pilot of the second plane was
required to use the highest degree of care in order to avoid a collision.
The supreme court in reversing a judgment in favor of the pilot-
owner of the first airplane held that the instruction was faulty, and
that the second pilot owed only the duty to exercise ordinary care in
the operation of his plane.
At the time of the accident there was no statute affecting the lia-
bility of the parties, but as the time of the decision by the supreme
25 Chapter 217, Laws of 1947, commonly referred to as the Reckless Flying Act.
260 fficial Wisconsin Airport Map, May 1, 1947, Wisconsin Aeronautics Com-
mission.
27201 Wis. 565, 230 N. W. 618, 1 Avi. 219 (1930).
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court (1930) the statutes provided28 that in such a case liability was
dependent upon the rules of law applicable to torts on land.
In Davies vs. Oshkosh Airport, Inc. 29 a pilot in landing at an air-
port struck a hay rake which had been left on one of the runways.
It was held that it was the duty of the pilot to maintain a proper look-
out for obstacles on the runways, and because of his breach of duty
he was guilty of contributory negligence which defeated recovery
against the airport.
At the time of the accident, which occurred July 10, 1928, Wis-
consin had not enacted its comparative negligence law.30 The court,
therefore, was not called upon to determine whether the airport was
negligent in permitting the hay rake to remain on the runway. Unless
adequate warning could be given to pilots, or unless the airfield had
been closed, the airport would be guilty of negligence in permitting
obstructions to remain on runways. In Pignet vs. City of Santa
Monica3 1 it was held that an airport was negligent in permitting an
automobile to be driven on a runway in the path of a plane engaged in
landing. In Peavey vs. City of Miami 2 it was held that the airport was
not negligent in permitting machinery to remain on a runway where
it appeared that the area of the runway in question was marked with
red lanterns and flags, and where it appeared that an appropriate
notice was printed in the pamphlet "Notice to Airmen" which is an
official publication of the Civil Aeronautics Authority.
There are no other decisions in Wisconsin involving liability for
damages caused by a plane crash or by objects thrown or falling from
a plane. The applicable statute3 3 imposes absolute liability upon the
owner of aircraft in flight for injury to persons or property on the
ground whether or not the pilot was negligent. Thus, the owner of
an airplane is liable for damages caused by a passenger leaping out
of the plane to commit suicide, or by a passenger throwing a bomb from
the plane, or by a crash of the plane shot down by an enemy, or by
a crash when the plane is being piloted by a thief.34 All of the author-
ities in the United States have thus far uniformly held the owner of
a plane liable for all damages to persons and property on the ground out-
side of an airport.
The rule of absolute liability, though exceptional, is not unknown in
Wisconsin jurisprudence. Most lawyers are cognizant of the statute 5
- Sec. 114.06, Wis. Stats., enacted by Chapter 348, Laws of 1929.
29214 Wis. 236, 252 N. W. 602, 1 Avi. 503 (1934).
10 Sec. 331.045, Wis. Stats., enacted by Chapter 242, Laws of 1931.
3129 Cal. App. (2d) 286, 84 P. (2d) 166, 1 Avi. 794; 45 Cal. App. (2d) 766, 115 P.
(2d) 194, 1 Avi. 984.
32 146 Fla. 629, 1 So. (2d) 614, 1 Avi. 955.
33 Sec. 114.05, Wis. Stats.
a4 Restatement, Law of Torts, Secs. 519, 520.
3 Sec. 192.44, Wis. Stats.
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which imposes absolute liability upon a railroad for fires on or along
its right-of-way. There is, however, no absolute liability imposed for
damage along the right-of-way caused by a collision of two trains or
by derailment, notwithstanding the fact that damage so caused would
be comparable to damage resulting from the crash of an aircraft.
Where damages are sought as between two aircraft which had
collided in flight, or as between a passenger or his representatives and
the aircraft in which the passenger had been flying, ordinary rules of
negligence apply.3 6 In every case involving passengers or aerial freight
or express, a painstaking study must be made to determine whether
the flight is governed by the Warsaw Convention . 3 ' The Convention is
a part of the law of the land3 8 and drastically limits recovery in cases
where it is controlling.
3 9
CONCLUSION.
The theme in the introduction to this discussion was that aviation
has come home to the main street lawyer. The enactment of the so-
called "reckless Flying Act" by the legislature at the current session,40
establishes our thesis. Operation of aircraft in a careless or reckless
manner so as to endanger the life or property of another is proscribed
by legislative fiat. In determining whether the operation was careless
or reckless the court shall consider the standards for safe operation
of aircraft prescribed by federal statutes or regulations governing aero-
nautics. The lawyer called upon to defend the local pilot who insists
upon "buzzing the town" must familiarize himself with the air traffic
rules adopted by the Federal Civil Aeronautics Board. If he is not a
pilot, or if he has not become familiar with the rules governing the
operation of an airplane, he will find himself in a labyrinth deprived
of the assistance of an Ariadne. Then will aviation law have come
home to the Main Street Lawyer!
36 Sec. 114.06, Wis. Stats.
37 U. S. Treaty Series 876, 49 Stat. 3000 (1936), Eng. Translation at 3014.
38 Clause 2, Article 6, Federal Constitution; Missouri vs. Holland, 252 U. S. 416.
39 $8,300 for death or injury to passenger, and $16.60 per kilogram for loss or
damage to goods. Compare limitation of ilability under Admiralty Law, 46 U.S.
C. A. Sec. 183; wrongful death statutes, Secs. 331.031 and 331.04 and Sec. 81.15,
Wis. Stats., which limits recovery by any person for personal injuries by de-
fect in highway to $5,000.
40 Chapter 213, Laws of 1947.
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